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Abstract 
 
There are numerous debates on the need to increase flexibility through deregulation 
of employment protection. Many believe it is essential in generating employment but it is also 
believed to generate socially unacceptable flexible jobs. However, recent studies point to 
strict regulations on firing permanent workers as the cause of increase in the shares of 
temporary employment. In other words, stringent protective regulations are not only a source 
of rigidity, but also force employers to increase flexibility in the labour market through other 
means. This study explores this hypothesis by examining various aspects of employment 
protection legislation in concomitance with other competing factors, including structural 
changes and labour market institutional factors, to explain the cross-national variance of 
temporary employment across 19 OECD countries using quantitative data. The results show 
that high cost of firing workers on permanent contracts is the most important factor that 
explains the high shares of temporary employment. This implies that there are two different 
ways in which flexibility has been introduced. Either introducing flexibility throughout the 
labour market using relaxed regulations on firing regular workers, or securing the core 
workers with high firing cost for regular workers while allowing for flexibility through the 
use of temporary employment. 
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1. Introduction 
After the oil shocks in the 1970s, all industrialized countries have been faced with the 
problem of high levels of persistent unemployment. Numerous approaches have been 
suggested as a solution to tackle this problem. One major stream of research, which includes 
the OECD Jobs Study report, calls for increase in the numerical flexibility in the labour 
market (OECD, 1994; OECD, 1997b; Andersen and Halvorsen, 2002:107; Auer and Cazes, 
2003a:2). These studies stress the need for deregulation in the market and more specifically 
deregulation of employment protection measures. Employment protection is seen as 
positively underpinning economic and employment growth (Auer and Cazes, 2003a:2), and 
is perceived to play a large role in the inability of European markets to create jobs compared 
to the more deregulated American or Anglo-Saxon markets (Scarpetta, 1996; Pissarides, 
2001; Bonoli and Sarfati, 2002:468; Esping-Andersen, 1999:132-4). However, although 
deregulation of the labour market is seen to create jobs, it is seen to create socially 
unacceptable jobs (Bonoli and Sarfati, 2002:470) and serves as a real danger for working and 
living standards through the rise of non-standard work arrangements (Auer and Cazes, 
2003a:2).  
However, recent study results show that the outcomes of deregulation might not 
always be the same. Many studies point to strict regulations on firing permanent workers as 
the cause of the increase in the shares of temporary contracts (Grubbs and Wells, 1993; 
Dolado et al., 2001; Booth et al., 2002; OECD, 1999; OECD, 2004a). In other words, 
stringent protective regulations are not only a source of rigidity, but they also force employers 
to increase flexibility in the labour market through other ways. The implications are two fold. 
Countries with high employment protection levels are not necessarily inflexible, since the 
employers, or the market adapts in different ways to increase flexibility in these conditions. 
Also, even in countries where there are stringent levels of protection, without deregulations, 
and more so because of the high regulation levels, socially unacceptable jobs can be 
developed. Employment protection regulation can contradict its purpose of protecting workers 
against dismissals and providing security, and actually increase insecurities for workers. 
However in this case, the spread of insecurity will be segmented. A portion of workers, the 
core workers, will be secured by high protection levels, while there will be an increase of 
flexibility in the periphery in the labour market. The development of flexibility can therefore 
be achieved in two different ways. Either flexibility is introduced throughout the labour 
market through deregulated employment protection levels, or there is a segmented market of 
flexible and instable jobs on one side and secured jobs through high protection levels on the 
other.  
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The aim of this study is to provide concrete empirical evidence for this claim. This is 
done through examining not only employment protection indices but numerous other factors 
that can explain the incidence of temporary employment, and also through examining large 
number of countries. Although the relationship between employment protection and 
temporary employment has been examined before, there is still a lack of in-depth empirical 
evidence. Many studies that provide empirical evidence based on a large number of country 
cases, limit their investigation to the bi-variate effect of EPL. Although a small number of 
studies use variables other than EPL, they do not incorporate variables based on the 
theoretical basis of their effect on temporary employment. These types of approaches cannot 
account for the numerous other factors that might be the actual determinants for the shares of 
temporary work. By incorporating other factors into the study, we are able to draw a more 
complex picture of how various labour market institutions and structural changes affect the 
relationship between employment protection levels and temporary employment. Also to 
provide grounds for further generalization, large number of country cases is investigated. The 
studies that have examined more in-depth factors to explain for the levels of temporary 
employment have mostly been limited to single-country case studies which prevent 
generalization of their results. To overcome these shortcomings, we use 19 OECD country 
cases in our model which provides us with a broader outlook on the comparative situations of 
the countries. Another limitation to the previous studies on the effect of EPL on temporary 
employment is that most have focused only on the overall EPL or the EPL for regular workers. 
Most studies do not examine the effect of EPL for temporary employment or the effect of its 
different disaggregated indices on the incidences of temporary employment. They also do not 
examine the effects of the combinations of different regulatory factors, such as strict EPL for 
regular workers with relaxed EPL for temporary workers. Here, disaggregated indicators and 
different combinations of employment protection regulations are examined combined with 
other factors.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we examine the notion of 
flexibility and the definitions of temporary work and employment protection. This is followed 
by a summary of earlier studies of the relationship between the level of temporary work and 
EPL. We then go on to examine the literature to find other competing theories concerning the 
factors influencing the cross-national variance of temporary employment. Afterwards, the 
best-fit model to explain the shares of temporary employment will be presented. Another 
aspect investigated here is how various independent variables affect EPL levels and their 
indirect effects on the shares of temporary employment. Using the best-fit model derived from 
the earlier sections, different aspects of EPL are examined to determine their effect on shares 
of temporary employment. Lastly, the implications of the outcomes are considered and then 
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we arrive at some conclusions on what are the real factors that explain for the variance in the 
incidence of temporary employment. Also the notion of flexible labour markets and different 
paths countries took to achieve this is examined. 
 
2. Previous studies on temporary employment 
2-1. Labour market flexibility 
Flexibility is the ability to change according to situations. Referring to the labour 
market, flexibility is the extent and speed of adaptation to market shocks which entails that 
institutional and behavioural rigidities in labour markets and enterprises slow price and 
quantity adjustments (Standing, 1999: 49). In this sense a totally flexible labour market is 
one where no financial, institutional, linguistic, political and cultural impediments are 
present (Monastiriotis, 2003: 3). Although deregulation and flexibility are often used 
interchangeably, deregulation and flexibility do not always entail the same meaning, for one 
can occur without the other (Monastiriotis, 2003:5; Robinson, 1999:84). This will be 
discussed further in the later sections. Flexibility can be achieved in many ways but usually 
categorized by where the flexibility takes place, inside the firm or outside, and how it is 
developed, functionally or numerically (for more see Atkinson, 1984; Monastiriotis, 2003). 
Functional flexibility entails changing the production system, or technology used to enhance 
flexibility, while numerical flexibility entails adjustment of the number of workers or the 
hours they work. Most refer to external numerical flexibility when addressing the issues of 
flexibility. External numerical flexibility consists of adjusting the labour intake from the 
external market and is related to increase in the use of atypical employment including, 
temporary, part-time employment and deregulation of restriction on hiring and firing workers 
(Monastiriotis, 2003:6). It is this type of flexibility that has been acknowledged as the key 
component to tackle the problems of structural unemployment that have risen in the past 
couple of decades (for example, OECD 1994; 1997; EC, 2003).  
The most common way to measure external numerical flexibility is by examining a 
countrys Employment Protection Legislation levels, use of temporary work and part-time 
work, by looking at average tenure for workers or their mobility in the labour market and so 
on. Although all indicate labour market flexibility in the macro level, they measure different 
aspects. EPL index is a governance indicator reflecting provisions by law or policies, while 
share of non-stable employment is more a contractual indicator, reflecting the actual 
contracts used in the labour market. Average tenure is a behavioural indicator measuring the 
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actual behaviour, may it be voluntary or involuntary, of the workers in the market (See 
Standing, 1999:170; Dasgupta, 2001). Although all indicate the same type of flexibility in the 
labour market in different aspects, they do not always coincide with each other. We will 
examine this in more detail by looking at the relationship between temporary employment and 
EPL, and the effect of the two on tenure. 
 
2-2. Temporary employment 
According to the OECD, temporary jobs are forms of dependant employment1 which 
do not offer workers the prospect of a long-lasting employment relationship (OECD, 2002a: 
132). The key aspect to this definition, compared to the open-ended permanent contracts, is 
the limited time length of the contract which may derive from employers need to adjust to the 
economic cycles or from the characteristics of the job. Although fix-term contracts are the 
biggest share of this type of employment, it also includes temporary agency workers, 
contracts for a specific task, replacement contracts, seasonal work, on-call work, daily 
workers, trainees, persons in government job creation schemes  and so on (OECD, 2002a). 
Booth et al. (2002) identify two different types of temporary employment by referring to one 
as seasonal/casual temporary jobs, those that are by nature temporary, and fixed-term contract 
employment where the temporal character derives from the contract under which the worker 
is hired (Booth et al., 2002:182). The latter type of temporary work can also be distinguished 
by the way in which it is used. It can be used for probation reasons, where the employer offers 
the worker a temporary job in the initial period of employment before offering a permanent 
contract. This allows employers to dismiss the workers without high termination cost if the 
worker proves to be unsatisfactory. Another way temporary workers can be used is as 
replacements for permanent workers on different types of leaves, including maternity and 
sickness. The third type of temporary work is used to adjust to the rapidly changing economic 
environment where employers find it easier to hire and fire workers on short-term/fixed term 
contracts (Booth et al., 2002:182). The first and the third type of temporary work, the use of 
temporary work to avoid high firing cost of regular or permanent contracts, bring us to the 
question of employment regulations and temporary work usage. How do different 
employment regulations, more specifically employment protection legislation for regular 
workers, affect the overall shares of temporary work in a country? In the following sections, 
                                                
 
1  Here dependant employment entails employment that is employed through an employee, which 
excludes self-employment. 
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we will examine this question and the relationship between EPL and temporary work in 
greater detail. 
 
2-3. Employment protection legislation  
Employment protection refers to the protection workers have against unfair or 
unjustified dismissal. There are many ways in which this can be provided, such as collective 
bargaining and individual contract agreements. However this paper uses the OECD 
employment protection legislation (EPL) index which measures the legislative aspect of 
employment protection, for this indicator enables us to compare the regulation standards 
among large number of countries and also to compare the results to previous studies. EPL 
refers to the regulations that concern hiring and firing of workers on both permanent and 
temporary contracts (OECD, 1999:50). EPL index for regular workers is measured by 
strictness in the regulations for regular procedural inconveniences, notice and severance pay 
for no-fault individual dismissals, and difficulty of dismissals. The strictness of EPL for 
temporary workers is measured according to which contracts are considered acceptable, 
number of successive contracts or renewals and based on the maximum accumulated 
durations of contracts. This is measured for the fixed-term contracts and also for temporary 
agency workers (TWA: Temporary Work Agencies)2. As we can see, EPL for regular workers 
concerns the costs for employers of firing workers on regular contracts, while EPL for 
temporary workers refers to the regulations concerning hiring practices.  
 
2-4. EPL and the level of temporary work 
Two hypotheses can be derived based on the previous studies on the relationship of 
employment protection and temporary work. If the employment protection level of regular 
workers is high, firing regular workers will be costly and employers will choose to adjust their 
work force to the economic cycles by using temporary contracts. Similarly, in countries with 
low protection for regular workers, employers will not have a need to use temporary workers 
because costs that arise when dismissing regular workers will be low. On the other hand, if 
the regulations on hiring temporary workers are strict there will be lower usage of temporary 
work (OECD, 1999; OECD, 2002a; Booth et al., 2002; Dolado et al. 2001; Cahuc and Postal-
                                                
 
2 For further information on specific scoring and weighting of the indices see Annex 2.  
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Vinay 2001). Especially when temporary contracts are restricted to particular jobs, such as 
seasonal jobs, employers are not able to substitute regular contracts with temporary contract. 
Reforms that allow a wider use of temporary contracts for a broad range of jobs have been 
seen to increase the levels of temporary jobs in country cases (Güell and Petrongolo, 2000; 
Güell, 2003).  Most empirical study results confirm this theory although some studies show 
conflicting results. 
In various bi-variate analyses, EPL for regular workers does seem to have a positive 
relationship with the overall incidence of temporary employment and for different groups of 
the labour market, although this relationship is not always significant (see Grubb and Wells, 
1993; Dolado et al. 2001; Booth et al., 2002; OECD, 1999; OECD, 2004a). However, multi-
variate regression analyses do not always show results that correspond to the hypothesis. The 
regression analyses done by the OECD incorporate different EPL measures and their effect on 
the shares of temporary employment. The results show that EPL for regular workers 
significantly reduces temporary employment, while EPL for temporary workers increases the 
shares of temporary workers although this relationship is insignificant (OECD, 1999). In a 
more complex model, Nunziata and Staffolani (2001; 2005) incorporate various wage 
pressure institutions such as wage setting institutions, unemployment benefit measures and 
the tax wedge to assess the impact of employment protection measures on the incidence of 
temporary employment. The results from their 2001 study also show results that contradict the 
theory. Less stringent employment regulations for regular workers have a significant positive 
impact on temporary employment, less stringent fixed-term contract regulations have 
significant positive impact on temporary employment in good economic conditions, and less 
stringent TWA regulations have an incremental effect on temporary employment (Nunziata 
and Staffolani, 2001). The results from the 2005 study are different. Strict EPL for permanent 
workers is seen to increase temporary employment, looser fixed term contract regulations to 
increase permanent contracts and looser temporary work agency regulations to increase 
temporary employment (Nunziata and Staffolani, 2005).  
The combination of strict employment protection for regular workers with the 
liberalisation of regulation for temporary workers has also been seen as the reason for the 
increased use of temporary contracts (Grubb and Wells, 1993; OECD, 2002a). This 
combination is pointed to as the main reason for the sharp increase of temporary employment 
in countries such as Spain and France (Dolado et al., 2001; Blanchard and Landier, 2001). 
Using a large number of country cases, Nunziata and Staffolani (2005) explain that there are 
complementary effects (Nunziata and Staffolani, 2005:17) where different combinations of 
regulations for different workers increase their effect on employment. They show that the 
 10
effect temporary work agency regulations have on temporary employment becomes stronger 
when employment protection for regular workers is strict. When fixed term contract 
regulations are strict with loose temporary work agency regulations, the effect of EPL for 
regular workers becomes stronger on temporary employment levels, while this is not the case 
when there is strict TWA with loose fixed term regulations (Nunziata and Staffolani, 2005). 
The OECD (2004a) examines how the relative difference between regulations for regular and 
temporary contracts3 might act as an incentive to hire temporary contracts. Using a regression 
model incorporating other labour market institutions4, this relative difference is shown to have 
a significant effect on the incidence of temporary employment for the total workforce, youths 
and low-skilled workers (OECD, 2004a).  
 
2-5. Competing theories on levels of temporary employment 
Although we can assume from the literature that EPL indicators will have an effect on 
the share of temporary employment in a country, this effect is questionable if we do not 
control for the other variables that might also be influential. By looking at other factors we 
can compare the effects of EPL and of other determinants to find which factor contributes 
more explanatory power. Although some of the studies reviewed above do incorporate several 
other factors in their analysis of the effect of employment regulation measures, they limit 
these variables to labour market institutions that affect wage levels. Based on preliminary 
studies, it is clear that these variables are not sufficient to understand the exactly why there 
are differences in the shares of temporary employment between countries. Even in the studies 
that incorporate variables other than EPL indices, the explanatory power does not reach even 
the 50 percent range. In this section, we consider structural changes such as globalization, 
recession, deindustrialization and other labour market structure, and labour market institutions 
such as bargaining structures, union strength, unemployment benefit systems, active labour 
market policy expenditure, and the impact of the tax wedge as factors that might account for 
cross-national variance of temporary employment.   
 
                                                
 
3  This is measured here by dividing the gap between the EPL for regular workers and EPL for 
temporary workers by EPL for temporary workers. Relative difference of EPL = (EPL regular workers 
 EPL for temporary workers)/EPL for temporary workers 
4 The regression model include output gap, tax wedge, high coordination dummy, low-coordination 
dummy, expenditure on ALMP per unemployed and constant term.  
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Structural factors 
Globalisation 
Globalisation is a structural factor that is perceived to increase the need for flexibility 
in the labour market. There are many ways in which globalization affects the labour market. 
First, liberalization of the world economy or countries integration into the world economy 
brings increases in competition of national economies. This leads to changes in production 
systems of firms as well as changes in labour demand. Lean production or just-in-time 
inventory are the new types of production systems that adjust production and the labour force 
to labour market fluctuations more quickly than before, resulting in growth in non-standard 
work (Mishra, 1999: 25). Also, increases in the freedom of capital to move to other 
production sites mean that workers have to compete against low wage workers in other 
countries, thus decreasing the demand for low-skilled labour. The competition for product and 
capital market also brings about an increase in the elasticity of wages and labour demand, 
especially for workers that can be substituted by foreign workers (Rodrik, 1997; Sapir, 2000). 
The bargaining power of labour weakens when elasticity of labour increases especially in 
periods of chronic unemployment. This decrease in bargaining power enables capital to 
achieve flexibility in many ways, including employing workers on atypical contracts (Mishra, 
1999; Rodrik, 1997). Based on this, we can assume that globalization, or increased market 
integration into the global market will increase the overall level of temporary employment 
directly by the increased use of temporary contracts by employers. On the other hand, 
increased globalization might also bring about changes in the EPL levels, through increased 
bargaining power of employers and their need for flexibility, which will increase the 
temporary employment levels indirectly. 
Many scholars challenge the view that globalization will necessary bring about 
deregulation in the labour institutions, suggesting that globalisation will act as an incentive for 
governments to intervene and improve their regulation standards to cope with the increase in 
vulnerability (Castles, 2004; Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik, 1997; Garrett, 1998). This line of 
argument implies that there might actually be an increase in the regulation in some ways due 
to the increase in the instabilities in the market. Even if there is a general need to increase the 
flexibility in the market, governments and politicians might choose to provide some kind of 
security as a way to gain support from the population. As noted in the later sections, contrary 
to what is commonly believed to be the case, there are countries which have increased their 
protection levels for both regular workers and temporary workers. However, what the studies 
that maintain that there might be an increase in protection due to globalization, mainly point 
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to the improvement of social protection levels to compensate for the deregulation in the 
employment protection or increase in market flexibility. This suggests that countries may 
choose the strategy of increasing flexibility in their markets while simultaneously increasing 
security through social policy measures. Important examples are the Flexicurity strategies 
adopted in the Netherlands and Denmark. Such strategies involve governments intervening by 
increasing security through benefits or other measures for the now more flexibilized or more 
disadvantaged work force in their labour market (see Wilthagen and Rogowski, 2002; 
Wilthagen and Tros, 2004). 
 
Economic cycles 
There is also evidence that long protracted recession and economic cycles are 
important factors in explaining the rise in the level of temporary jobs (Pot et al., 2000; 
Morishima, 2001; Holmlund and Storrie, 2002; OECD, 2002a). Protracted recession is 
perceived to be an important reason for the increase in the shares of temporary employment in 
the Netherlands, Japan and Sweden (Pot et al., 2000; Morishima, 2001; Holmlund and Storrie, 
2002; OECD, 2002a). Holmlund and Storrie report that there is a sharp decrease in temporary 
work in the initial stage of recession by overall increase in unemployment. This is followed 
by an increase in temporary work at the end of recession compared to a rather slow increase 
for regular workers (Holmlund and Storrie, 2002). They also conclude that the changes in 
legislation and supply side preferences cannot explain the overall growth of temporary work 
during this time, which are mostly due to economic changes affecting the demand side 
(Holmlund and Storrie, 2002: 262~3). In other words, depressed product and labour market 
conditions will create incentives for firms and individuals to use and accept temporary 
contracts (Holmlund and Storrie, 2002: 264). For the firms, the cost of finding workers or 
preventing workers from quitting their current jobs and moving on to others will decline when 
unemployment is high because of the lack of jobs overall. Furthermore, depressed market 
situations increase firms incentives to use temporary contracts to screen workers and adapt to 
volatile markets (Holmlund and Storrie, 2002:263~264) especially when market prospects are 
gloomy and unstable. Recession will also affect individual workers behaviour in taking up 
temporary jobs, especially in countries that do not provide generous benefits during 
unemployment. Workers will have no choice but to accept these types of employment, when 
there are no alternatives to support their incomes. Similarly recession may also affect the 
overall bargaining power of the unions to accept not only wage cuts but flexible labour 
contracts. Recession or unemployment can also affect employment protection levels. Many 
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governments have chosen to maintain or enforce their employment protection legislation to 
protect workers from the dangers of persistent unemployment since the end of the 1970s 
(Cahuc and Postal-Vinay, 2001). In this case, unemployment rates will have an indirect effect 
on the incidence of temporary employment through changes in EPL levels especially for 
regular workers.  This suggests that countries that have experienced protracted recession are 
likely to have higher levels of temporary work than those which have not. 
 
Deindustrialization 
Economies with high concentrations of workers in industries which tend to have a 
higher prevalence of temporary work, such as agriculture and services, might be another 
factor that affects the level of temporary work in a country. In the case of agriculture, due to 
its seasonal character many employees are on temporary contracts and the high concentration 
of workers in this sector will bring high incidence of temporary employment in the overall 
economy. For example, the OECD notes that the high incidence of temporary workers in 
Greece, Mexico and Turkey is due to their high share of agriculture workers (OECD, 2002a). 
However, for agriculture employment is on the decline in most countries, the shift of workers 
from an industry-based to a services-based economy or the process of deindustrialization is 
more important. Service sectors use more flexible contracts than industry sectors (OECD, 
2002a; Debels, 2004), so the shift of workers to services or a high concentration of workers in 
the service sector might lead to a large share of temporary contracts in that country. Another 
way how deindustrialization or changes in economic structure may increase the shares of 
temporary employment is through an increase in redundant workers and their skill loss from 
this shift. A large scale decline in manufacturing creates mass redundancy amongst workers, 
many of whom lack skills for employment in other sectors. These workers do not have a 
choice but to be employed in interim companies or in temporary contracts, resulting in an 
increase in the share of temporary employment. Standing gives the example of Lorraine, an 
industrial area of France, where, in the late 1980s, the decline in the iron and steel industries 
brought about 50 percent increase in interim companies and a large increase in fixed term 
contracts (Villeval, 1990:5 ; Standing, 1999: 106).  
High levels of temporary work may, therefore, derive from shifts to different sectors 
or a high concentration of workers in certain sectors of the economy. However, it may also be 
an outcome of increase in the incidences across all industries. Holmlund and Storrie (2002) 
find that employment shift to services does not explain much of the rise in temporary work in 
Sweden during the 1990s. Also in the case of the UK, the changing industrial composition of 
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employment is not seen as accounting for much of the increase in temporary work (Forde and 
Slater, 2001). Yet because these findings derive from single-country case-studies, we cannot 
necessarily expect the same result when examining cross-national variance of the level of 
temporary work. Moreover, this study does not focus on the changes in levels but on 
differences between countries at one point in time. For this reason, it seems worth 
investigating whether different rates of employment in sectors with high concentration of 
temporary contracts are accounting for the cross-national variance of temporary employment. 
 
Labour market institutions  
Wage bargaining institutions and union strength 
There are four different factors relating to bargaining institutions that must be taken 
into consideration when examining employment rates or other labour market indicators. They 
are union density, collective bargaining coverage rate, centralization of bargaining, and 
coordination of bargaining. Both trade union density and collective bargaining coverage rate 
represent the union strength at the bargaining table. Union density is the percentage of 
workers that have membership in the union, and here it refers to net members excluding 
those who are non-active (OECD, 2004b:144). Collective bargaining coverage rate measures 
the extent salaried workers are subject to union-negotiated terms and conditions in 
employment (OECD, 2004b:146). The relationship between the two measures is complex. 
Many countries have administrative rules and extensions of wage agreements that supplement 
union representation in wage bargaining (Scarpetta, 1996:54; Buti et al., 1998:24), making it 
unnecessary for workers to become actual members of the union. This can make the collective 
bargaining coverage rate a better measurement of union power. On the other hand, Buti et al. 
note that the difference between the two can be interpreted as artificial union power 
meaning the strength of unions which is not based on unions ability to gain support from 
workers, such as membership (Buti et al. 1998: 24).  
Centralization describes the locus of the formal structure of wage bargaining 
(OECD, 1997a:70). It describes the level where wage bargaining and negotiations take place, 
and it varies from company or plant levels to central, national level negotiation by peak 
organizations. Centralization and collective bargaining coverage rates are correlated in the 
sense that high coverage rates indicate more workers are covered by agreements bargained 
usually at the more central, national or industry, level rather than through individual 
agreements. Coordination on the other hand describes the degree of consensus between the 
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social partners taking part in bargaining. This can vary from fragmented bargaining with no 
coordination between the partners to high levels of coordination between partners, either 
informal or formal, that encompass a wide range of unions and employers. The bargaining 
power of unions or bargaining structures can influence shares of temporary employment in 
many ways. It may influence employers ability to introduce various flexible contracts inside 
the labour market. It may also have an indirect effect on the development of temporary 
contracts through employment protection levels. 
Unions oppose increases in flexible work contracts because they are destructive to 
industrial relations through their effect on segmentation of the workers (Delsen, 1995: 96). 
Since union membership is usually centred on permanent workers, and because flexible 
workers have different behavioural patterns and attitudes, rise in temporary jobs may result in 
decline in union membership (Delsen, 1995). Therefore, unions try to restrict the development 
of temporary workers in many countries, because a decline in union membership would in the 
long run decrease the overall strength of unions and their influence over society (Campbell, 
2004; EIRO, 2002). There might also be a reverse causality in this relationship. While it may 
be that stronger unions will limit the development of temporary employment, employers 
might be able to introduce flexible contracts more easily where the bargaining power of 
unions is weak. It might be easier to increase temporary employment in countries with 
decentralized bargaining for there might be fewer restrictions on the use of different types of 
contracts. However, a more centralized and coordinated bargaining system can deal with the 
externalities by internalizing the costs that derive from it, compared to a decentralized, 
uncoordinated system. When wage bargaining is centralized and there is a high coverage rate 
of the bargaining outcomes, it is less clear who will benefit and be harmed from various 
consequences of various bargaining outcomes (OECD, 1997a:65). It is uncertain how this will 
affect the development of temporary jobs. However, there are examples of countries with 
highly coordinated social partners with centralized bargaining systems that have introduced 
various flexibility measures in the labour market to tackle the problem of unemployment. 
Denmark and the Netherlands both have unions with strong bargaining powers and long 
histories of negotiation between the social partners in the central level, but have also 
introduced flexibility in the labour market through various means including deregulating 
employment protection, with the aim of bringing down unemployment over the past decade 
(See Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Madsen, 2003, 2004; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004). Also, in 
recent years, many unions have changed their perspective on the use of atypical employment, 
and rather than opposing the use of flexible employment contracts, they are addressing the 
problems that arise from the use of these job types such as wage and benefit discrimination 
(EIRO, 2002; Campbell, 2004). 
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Another way bargaining structures can affect the incidence of temporary employment 
is through employment protection. Employment stability through protection against dismissal 
is essential for workers and unions to gain bargaining power. If employment is not secured 
through regulations, and employers can fire workers easily, workers will not be able to put 
forward their say in the bargaining table. For this reason, stronger unions will strive to secure 
workers employment through strict regulations. This effect is likely to be stronger when union 
bargaining is centralized and unions are able take part in more macro policy decisions. Saint-
Paul examines the political economy of unions in employment protection, using the balance 
between rent of job security, and gains from creative destruction, in other words, the gain 
from ease of workers moving into new high-tech, more productive industries (Saint-Paul, 
2002). He concludes that employment protection is more likely to arise in countries with 
stronger unions, collective bargaining, and more stringent rules that enable workers to obtain 
their wage above their alternative wage (Saint-Paul, 2002:696). Also, because many unions 
concentrate more on the welfare of permanent workers, and regard temporary employment as 
path towards permanent workers (Delsen, 1995: Campbell, 2004), unions are likely to stress 
the rights of those with standard jobs. This may result in unions protecting regulations 
regarding permanent workers and not those on temporary workers.  
Overall, strong unions with centralized bargaining are likely to be a factor promoting 
fewer temporary contracts. However, union strength may also increase the employment 
protection level, especially regulations on firing regular workers, thus increasing the level 
indirectly. Empirical studies show that collective bargaining coverage rate, and excess 
bargaining coverage rate5 increase overall EPL (Buti et al., 1998:24~25; Chung, 2003:85). In 
a more direct relationship, union strength has a negative effect on temporary employment 
rates but this is mitigated by close coordination (Nunziata and Staffolani, 2001). Another 
analysis shows that higher collective bargaining coverage rates and wage floors accentuate the 
effect of employment protection for women, youth and immigrant workers, decreasing their 
probability of obtaining permanent employment (Kahn, 2005).  
 
Unemployment benefit 
Unemployment benefit generosity and duration can affect incentives for workers to 
take up temporary employment, in much the same way as they affect the unemployed in 
                                                
 
5 This is measured as the difference between collective bargaining coverage rate and union density 
(Buti et al., 1998:24).  
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taking jobs. Generous unemployment benefit with long duration and high replacement rate 
has been seen to increase the unemployment duration of its recipients (Danziger et al.,1981; 
Moffit and Nicholson, 1982; Moffit, 1985; Ham and Rea, 1987; Corson and Nicholson, 1988; 
Katz and Meyer,1990). However, this effect is disputed by Burtless (1990), Holumlund 
(1998), and Atkinson and Micklewright (1991), all of whom show that this is not always the 
case and that different countries tend to show different effects. Although generous benefits 
have been seen to make job searchers choosy by increasing their reservation wage and 
decreasing their job search efforts (Scarpetta, 1996:51~52; Nickell, 1997:67), it has also been 
suggested that they encourage unemployed workers to take up jobs better suited to their 
specific skills-set in the longer run, thus making their employment more sustainable (Yoo et 
al., 2002). Active labour market measures have also been seen to offset the effect generous 
benefit has on the unemployed by giving them incentives to go back into work (Nickell, 
1997:57; Nickell, 2003b). If workers do loose incentives to take up jobs, especially low-
paying jobs, this is likely to affect take up of temporary jobs more than permanent jobs. This 
is a consequence of the fact that temporary jobs usually have lower pay with lower benefits, 
and most temporary jobs are taken involuntarily (see Delsen, 1995; Güell, 2003; European 
Commission, 2002; Debels, 2004). Thus, generous replacement rates and longer duration of 
unemployment benefits will have a negative effect on the incidence of temporary employment. 
If the tax wedge is large this effect is likely to increase.  
 
The tax wedge 
The tax wedge is the difference between gross labour costs to employers and the 
wage paid to employees (Scarpetta, 1996:53) and consists of income tax, employees and 
employers social insurance contribution (defined by the OECD, 2004c). The size of the tax 
wedge affects employment by increasing the labour costs, which impacts on the incentive for 
job creation, and thereby on labour demand (European Commission, 2004). This effect can be 
especially harmful for low-skilled workers or low wage workers. In countries with large tax 
wedges, employers are not able to reduce wages to compensate for an increase in the non-
wage labour costs, especially when there is a binding wage floor through statutory minimum 
wages or negotiated minimum wages (Scarpetta, 1996; World Bank, 2005). As most 
temporary jobs are concentrated in low-wage jobs (OECD, 2002a; Caladrino and 
Gagliarducci, 2004; Debels, 2004), this means that employers will reduce temporary jobs in 
these situations. On the other side of the market, if the size of the tax wedge is large, there 
will be a gap between before and after tax wages. For the unemployed receiving generous 
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benefits, this might make them lose their incentive to participate in the labour market, 
especially if there is not much difference between after tax wages and benefit levels. 
Countries with large tax wedges usually have generous unemployment benefits, since the tax 
wedge, which includes social insurance contributions, to some extent represents the 
generosity of the social security system (Nickell et al., 2005). On the other hand, if temporary 
workers are excluded in the social insurance scheme, employers might have an incentive to 
employ workers on temporary contracts when insurance contributions are high6. 
The size of the tax wedge might also have different implications for different groups 
of the labour market. Bertola et al. (2002) found that labour taxes have positive effects on 
employment differentials between different groups in the labour market. They show how 
large tax wedges lead young workers and women to engage in their relatively more attractive 
non-employment activities such as education and home production (Bertola et al., 2002: 27). 
The size of the tax wedge might influence the wage floors, and thus decrease the likelihood of 
obtaining permanent jobs, therefore increasing shares of temporary workers especially for the 
disadvantaged groups (Kahn, 2005).  
 
Active labour market policy expenditure 
There is also evidence that public employment programmes for workers, especially 
for those who are categorized as the disadvantaged in the labour market, might increase the 
overall level of temporary work (OECD 2002a; Dolado et al., 2001; Lechner et al., 2000). 
Many countries use public employment programmes that provide different groups, such as 
youth, female, low-skilled, long-term unemployed, with temporary work experience and job 
training to enhance their work abilities (OECD, 2002b). In addition, governments also 
subsidize the private sector to employ disadvantaged workers in temporary contracts as part 
of active labour market policy measures. Therefore, countries with lengthy temporary training 
programmes or temporary subsidized employment programmes will have higher levels of 
temporary workers, other things being equal. On the other hand, active labour market policies 
have been seen to off-set the effects of other labour market institutions. It can off-set the 
disincentives generous benefit systems have on employment through improving chances to 
obtain work and by providing greater efficiency in job matching (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 
2003a). This may affect temporary employment in the sense that it may increase the 
                                                
 
6 For example the Spanish government introduced social security contribution rebates to increase the 
transition of temporary contracts into permanent ones (see Dolado et al., 2001).  
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attractiveness of choosing temporary jobs compared to receiving benefits for the unemployed. 
Hiring subsidies can also offset the effect high wage costs or employment protection will have 
on employment (OECD, 2002b). Therefore, high expenditure on active labour market policies 
can be a factor explaining high levels of temporary employment of countries.  
 
3. Explaining the cross-national variance in the incidence of temporary 
employment 
3-1. Incidence of temporary employment 
 
Table1 Incidence of temporary employment (as a percentage of the total dependant 
employment) of 19 OECD countries for 2003 (%) 
 
 Change Country  
1985 
(1) 
1990 
(2) 
1997 
(3) 
2003 
(4) 1 to 4 2 to 4 3 to 4 
US   - -  4.6    4.0 a     -     - - 0.6 
Ireland   7.3  8.5  9.4  5.1 - 2.2 - 3.4 - 4.3 
UK   7.0  5.2  7.4  5.8 - 1.2   0.6 - 1.6 
Austria  - -  6.6  7.2     -     -   0.6 
Belgium   6.9  5.3  6.3  8.6   1.7   3.2   2.3 
Norway  - - 11.8  9.4     -     - - 2.3 
Italy   4.8  5.2  8.2  9.5   4.7   4.3   1.3 
Denmark  12.3 10.8 11.1  9.6 - 2.7 - 1.2 - 1.5 
Greece  21.1 16.5 10.9 11.1 - 10.0 - 5.5   0.2 
Germany  10.0 10.5 11.7 12.2   2.2   1.7   0.5 
Switzerland  -   12.6b 10.9 12.3     - - 0.4   1.4 
Canada  - - 11.3 12.4     -     -   1.1 
France   4.7 10.5 13.1 12.6   7.9   2.0 - 0.6 
Japan  10.2 10.6 11.0 13.8   3.6   3.1   2.8 
Netherlands   7.5  7.6 11.4 14.6     -   7.0   3.2 
Sweden  - - 14.6 14.7     -     -   0.1 
Finland  - - 18.3 16.4     -     - - 1.9 
Portugal    14.4c 18.3 12.2 21.0   6.6   2.7   8.8 
Spain    15.6d 29.8 33.6 30.6 15.0   0.8 - 3.0 
Un-weighted 
average 
 10.1 11.7 11.8 12.2 2.4   1.2    0.3 
Source:   OECD(2004) Labour Force Statistics 1983-2003, Paris.  
a : data for the US is for the year 2001. 
b: data for Switzerland is for 1991 
c: data for Portugal is for 1986 
d: data for Spain is for 1987 
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Table 1 displays the incidence of temporary employment as a percentage of the total 
dependant employment for the year 2003 or the latest year. As we can see, the US, Ireland 
and the UK, the liberal welfare states have the lowest level of temporary employment, while 
Portugal and Spain have the highest levels. We cannot find a distinct cluster of the southern 
European countries, as Italy and Greece are in the middle of the distribution. Their levels of 
temporary workforce as a percent of total dependant workforce are similar to those of the 
continental, and northern European countries. A family of nations pattern is not found for 
other countries as well, and mixed levels are displayed within the Nordic countries and the 
Conservative countries. As we can see in the next page this picture is similar to the EPL levels 
of countries. As for the changes in the shares of temporary jobs, as we can see there has been 
an increase overall, since the mid 1980s. However, some countries show decline in their 
shares, such as Greece, Denmark and Ireland, unlike in Spain and France, and to a lesser 
degree in the Netherlands and Portugal, there have been dramatic increases.  
 
3-2. Evolution of EPL 
The evolution of the strictness of EPL level for regular workers from the late 1980s to 
the year 2003 is displayed in Table 2 by order of their strictness for the year 2003. At a glance 
we can see that the liberal countries together with Denmark show low levels whereas for the 
other countries there is not a distinctive grouping of countries. The same can be said about the 
EPL levels for temporary workers. Liberal countries tend to show low levels of regulations 
and for the remainder of the countries, there is no clear pattern. However, contrary to most 
expectations, it is not the Southern European countries that have the most stringent levels of 
employment protection levels for permanent workers. Although this was the case in the late 
1980s, Spain, Italy and Greece have all deregulated their employment protection legislation 
levels to some extent and now the Netherlands and Sweden manifest higher levels. As for the 
EPL for temporary workers, the southern European countries still hold their place with the 
most stringent levels, with the exception of Italy, which has experienced major deregulations 
over the past 15 years. 
 
 
 
 21
Table 2 The evolution of EPL for regular workers 19 OECD countries from late 1980s to 
2003  
 
Country 
Late 
1980s 
(1) 
Late 
1990s 
(2) 
2003 
(3)  
Change 
(1) to (2) 
Change 
from (2) 
to (3) 
Change 
from (1) 
to (3) 
United States 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  
United Kingdom 0.8 0.9 1.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  
Switzerland 1.2 1.2 1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Canada 0.9 1.3 1.3  0.4  0.0  0.4  
Denmark 1.6 1.5 1.5  - 0.1  0.0  - 0.1  
Ireland 1.6 1.6 1.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Belgium 1.5 1.7 1.7  0.2  0.0  0.2  
Italy 2.8 1.8 1.8  - 1.0  0.0  - 1.0  
Finland 2.7 2.3 2.2  - 0.4  - 0.1  - 0.5  
Norway 2.4 2.3 2.3  - 0.1  0.0  - 0.1  
Austria 2.6 2.9 2.4  0.3  - 0.5  - 0.2  
Greece 2.5 2.3 2.4  - 0.2  0.1  - 0.1  
Japan 2.7 2.4 2.4  - 0.3  0.0  - 0.3  
France 2.3 2.3 2.5  0.0  0.2  0.2  
Spain 3.9 2.6 2.6  - 1.3  0.0  - 1.3  
Germany 2.7 2.7 2.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Sweden 2.8 2.9 2.9  0.1  0.0  0.1  
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 3.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Portugal 4.8 4.3 4.2  - 0.5  - 0.1  - 0.6  
        
Un-weighted 
Mean 2.27 2.12 2.11  - 0.15  - 0.01  -0.16  
Standard Dev 1.11 0.91 0.87     
Coefficient of 
variation    0.49    0.43    0.41     
 
Source:   OECD (2004) Employment Outlook, (1999) Employment Outlook Paris 
Note: The EPL index can have score from 0 to 6, with higher values representing more strict 
regulations.  
         
The overall trend of the EPL levels is towards greater deregulation. EPL for regular 
workers on average dropped from 2.27 to 2.11 decreasing by 0.16 over the last 15 years or so. 
Regulations for temporary workers changed more dramatically, dropping from a score of 2.59 
to 1.80, decreasing 0.79 over the years. Most of this change occurred between the late 1980s 
and the late 1990s, probably in response to the high unemployment rates of this period. The 
EPL change for temporary workers was biggest in Italy, Sweden, Belgium and Germany, all 
with the EPL index dropping 2 points or more.  However, this does not entail deregulation in 
all countries. With closer inspection we can see that there have been increases in the strictness 
of EPL for both regular workers and temporary workers in several countries. This is 
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especially true for countries with low levels of EPL, although the biggest increase happened 
in France which had stringent employment protection levels for temporary workers even in 
the late 1980s. The countries showing the biggest decrease in their indices were those with the 
highest levels of protection, with the exception of France.  
 
Table 3 The evolution of EPL for temporary workers 19 OECD countries from the late 1980s 
to 2003 
 
Country 
Late 
1980s 
(1) 
Late 
1990s 
(2) 
2003 
(3)  
Change 
from (1) to 
(2) 
Change 
from (2) to 
(3) 
Change 
from (1) to 
(3) 
Canada 0.3 0.3 0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  
United States 0.3 0.3 0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  
United Kingdom 0.3 0.3 0.4  0.0  0.1  0.1  
Ireland 0.3 0.3 0.6  0.0  0.3  0.3  
Switzerland 0.9 1.1 1.1  0.2  0.0  0.2  
Netherlands 2.4 1.2 1.2  - 1.2  0.0  - 1.2  
Japan 2.3 1.6 1.3  - 0.7  - 0.3  - 1.0  
Denmark 2.6 1.4 1.4  - 1.2  0.0  - 1.2  
Austria 1.8 1.5 1.5  - 0.3  0.0  - 0.3  
Sweden 4.1 1.6 1.6  - 2.5  0.0  - 2.5  
Germany 3.8 2.3 1.8  - 1.5  - 0.5  - 2.0  
Finland 1.9 1.9 1.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Italy 5.4 3.6 2.1  - 1.8  - 1.5  - 3.3  
Belgium 4.6 2.6 2.6  - 2.0  0.0  - 2.0  
Portugal 3.4 3.0 2.8  - 0.4  - 0.2  - 0.6  
Norway 3.5 3.1 2.9  - 0.4  - 0.2  - 0.6  
Greece 4.8 4.8 3.3  0.0  - 1.5  - 1.5  
Spain 3.5 3.3 3.5  - 0.2  0.2  0.0  
France 3.1 3.6 3.6  0.5  0.0  0.5  
        
Un-weighted 
Mean 2.59 1.99 1.80  - 0.61  - 0.19  - 0.79  
Standard Dev 1.64 1.31 1.06     
Coefficient of 
variation    0.63    0.66    0.59     
Source:   OECD (2004) Employment Outlook, (1999) Employment Outlook Paris 
Note: The EPL index can have score from 0 to 6, with higher values representing more strict 
regulations.  
 
These changes combined show somewhat of a convergence of EPL levels, both for 
regular workers and temporary workers, throughout the examined countries. This is 
confirmed by the standard deviation and coefficient of variation scores for EPL levels 
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presented at the last two rows of the tables above. For permanent workers, the coefficient of 
variation score drops from 0.49 to 0.41 for the 15 years or so, while for temporary workers the 
convergence is less distinctive as the coefficient variation score dropped from 0.63 to 0.597. 
Although the standard deviation of EPL for temporary workers did decrease more than EPL 
for regular workers, for there was a general decrease in the EPL index for temporary workers 
overall, the coefficient of variation score does not change much.  
Another important point to note here is that, if deregulating EPL was a response to 
persistent unemployment, most governments chose to tackle this problem by reforming 
temporary employment legislation rather than regulations pertaining to permanent 
employment. This is shown by the more dramatic change in EPL for temporary workers. This 
phenomenon only happened in countries with high levels of protection. Obviously in 
countries that had deregulated markets there would not have been need for deregulation, while 
in countries with high regulations, deregulation of employment legislations was the most 
common prescription taken up by governments for their labour reform8.  
 
3-3. Bi-variate analysis of EPL and temporary employment 
The bi-variate correlation of EPL and shares of temporary jobs in a country can be 
seen by examining the scatter plots given in Figure 1. Although there is not a definite 
clustering, some patterns among the countries do exist. Firstly, examining the relationship 
between EPL for regular workers and temporary employment, Spain and Portugal display 
both high EPL levels and high levels of temporary employment. Liberal countries, including 
the US, the UK and Ireland are to be found on the opposite end of the spectrum with low 
levels of both indices. This is also true for EPL for temporary work and the incidence of 
temporary employment. For other countries, there are no particular clusters of countries. 
                                                
 
7  This convergence might be from the pressures governments with high regulations face by the 
international organizations or liberal economists who point to employment regulations as the reason for 
the high persistent unemployment rates. However, this might also be an effect of the convergence 
among EU countries from the EU regulation standardization process. We do not go on this matter 
further here.  
8  EPL change for temporary workers is strongly negatively correlated (-.77) to EPL levels for 
temporary workers in late 1980s with high significance (.000 level) and EPL change for regular 
workers is strongly negatively correlated (-.66) to EPL levels for regular workers in late 1980s with 
high significance (.009 level). 
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Overall both EPL for regular workers and EPL for temporary workers explain a large extent 
of the cross-national variance in the incidence of temporary employment9. 
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fixed-term contract regulation for 2003
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Temporary work agency legislation 2003
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Figure 1 Scatter plot of various indicators of employment protection and the incidence of 
temporary employment in 19 OECD countries 
Source: Data on EPL levels are from Table 2, 3 data on temporary employment levels are from Table 1. 
Data on fixed-term contract regulations and TWA legislations are from Annex 3.  
**  : Significant at the 0.01 level /*  : Significant at the 0.05 level  
                                                
 
9 The R square scores for the plots are .375 for the plot with EPL for regular workers and .271 for the 
plot with EPL for temporary workers.  
Correlation: 
         0.62** 
Correlation: 
     0.53* 
Correlation: 
0.61** 
  Correlation:
                 0.32
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The strong positive relationship between the strictness of EPL for regular workers and 
the extent of temporary employment accords with our hypothesis. On the other hand, the 
effect of EPL for temporary workers and its disaggregated indicators, fixed-term contract 
regulations and TWA legislations, seem not to comply with our predictions. As we can see in 
Figure 1 and Table 4, contrary to our assumption, temporary employment shares are 
positively correlated with the strictness of EPL for temporary workers, and its disaggregate 
indices. This may be a consequence of the fact that in the countries where EPL for regular 
workers is strict, EPL for temporary workers is also strict.  
 
Table 4 Correlation between incidence of temporary employment and various disaggregate 
indicators of EPL of 19 OECD countries for 2003  
 
  incidence of temporary employment 
EPL for regular workers 2003     0.62** 
EPL for temporary workers 2003     0.53* 
Fixed-term contract regulation  2003     0.32 
Temporary work agency legislation 2003     0.61** 
Relative strictness of EPL for regular workers  - 0.12 
Correlations are Pearsons R correlation.  
**   : Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*     : Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Source: Data on EPL levels are from Table 2, 3 data on temporary employment levels are from Table 1. 
 
Table 5 confirms this by displaying a positive correlation between EPL for regular 
workers with EPL for temporary workers, and its disaggregate indices. This suggests that 
temporary employment levels are actually affected more by the EPL of regular workers rather 
than the EPL of temporary workers. This outcome fits in with the findings of Dolado et al. 
(2001), Booth et al. (2002), and Kahn (2005), that the temporary EPL index does not play any 
role in explaining the extent of temporary jobs in a country and that the genuine determinant 
of the share is the EPL for regular workers. However, for concrete evidence it is worthwhile 
to examine how EPL for temporary employment and its disaggregated indices affect the 
shares of temporary employment. It is especially important to see whether EPL indices of 
temporary employment have any effect on the incidences of temporary employment 
controlling for the strictness of EPL for regular workers. This will be done in the later 
sections.  
Lastly, Table 4 shows the correlation between the relative strictness of EPL for 
regular workers compared to temporary workers effect the incidence of temporary 
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employment. As we can see it also has no effect on the shares of temporary work, unlike the 
findings from the OECD (2004a) where it showed significance in explaining the incidence of 
temporary employment in total employment, youths and the low-skilled10. 
 
Table 5 Correlation between EPL for regular and EPL for temporary workers and its 
disaggregate measures of 19 OECD countries for 2003  
  EPL for regular workers 
EPL for temporary workers 2003    0.58** 
Fixed-term contract regulation  2003    0.39 
Temporary work agency legislation 2003    0.58** 
Correlations are Pearsons R correlation.  
**   : Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*     : Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Source: Data on EPL levels are from Table 2, 3 
 
3-4. Bi-variate analysis of competing factors and the incidence of temporary 
employment 
The correlation table of variables suggested to influence the incidence of temporary 
employment is displayed in Table 6 11 . As the table shows, only the ten year average 
unemployment ratio, used here to indicate recession, and agriculture as a percentage of 
dependant employment exhibit significant relationships with the use of temporary work. From 
this we can expect these variables to be an important factor in explaining the variance in 
temporary employment.  
Recession is measured by GDP growth and unemployment rate average for the past 
10 years. The two recession variables do not represent the same phenomenon and are not 
correlated. This is a consequence of the fact that economic growth can no longer be translated 
to good labour market performance. Countries with low economic growth may have, and have 
had low unemployment, like Switzerland and Japan, while high economic growth does not 
necessarily improve the unemployment situation, such as in Spain. For this reason, we explore 
the two recession variables separately, one representing the economic situation while the 
other represents the labour market situation. In any case, their effect on temporary 
employment seem to accord to the assumptions. Unemployment ratio average for the past 
                                                
 
10 The analysis done by the OECD incorporates labour market institution variables such as output gap, 
tax wedge, coordination dummy, expenditure on ALMP per unemployed, and constant term, and uses a 
pooled data of 16(14 for youth and low-skilled) countries. 
11 For a more information about the variable definition and sources see Annex 1.  
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decade has a highly significant positive relationship with the incidence of temporary 
employment. However, this direct correlation is driven by Spain. Spain has the highest 
average unemployment rate of 17.0 percent and also the highest incidence of temporary 
employment of 30.6 percent. Agricultural employment also displays a significantly positive 
relationship with the incidence of temporary employment. It confirms the assumption that 
countries with large concentration of workers in the agriculture industry will have large shares 
of temporary workers. 
 
Table 6 Correlation between temporary employment and various explanatory variables of 19 
OECD countries 
 
 
Incidence of temporary 
employment 2003 
FDI as percentage of GDP 5 year average a   0.01 
Share of trade as percentage of GDP 5 year average  - 0.19 
Real GDP growth rate 10 year average  - 0.18 
Unemployment ratio 10 year average    0.55* 
Agriculture percentage of dependant employment 2003 
(N=17) b   0.55* 
Service percentage of dependant employment 2003 (N=17) b - 0.43 
Union density average 1990, 2000 - 0.18 
Collective bargaining coverage for 1990, 2000 (N=17)d   0.25 
Centralization of wage setting 1990 to 2000 (N=18)e   0.27 
Coordination of wage setting 1990 to  2000 (N=18)e   0.10 
UB Gross benefit replacement rate 2001   0.16 
UB Benefit duration 2002   0.15 
Tax wedge for 2003   0.09 
ALMP as percentage of GDP 2002 c   0.15 
Employment generation as percentage of GDP 2002/01 c   0.09 
Correlations are Pearsons R correlations. 
**   : Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*     : Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Source:  OECD (2004) Labour Force Statistics, 1983-2003, Paris; OECD Labour Force Indicators; 
OECD Fact Book; OECD (2004) Employment Outlook, Paris. OECD (2004) Taxing Wages 
2002~2003, OECD (2004) Benefit and Wages. (See Annex 1 for more detail) 
a: 1) For Belgium the average is for 2002 and 2003 
    2) For Netherlands, Switzerland and the US the average is from 1999 to 2002. 
b: Data for Switzerland and Belgium is not available. 
c: For Canada, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, data used is from the latest year.  
d: Data for Greece and Ireland is not available. 
e: Data for Greece is not available.  
 
Not only do the majority of variables not exhibit significant relationships, but also in 
most cases the direction of the relationships also does not appear to fit with our hypothesis. It 
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was assumed that globalization would increase the need for flexibility in the labour market, 
and have a positive relationship with the incidence of temporary employment. However the 
opposite holds true according to the relationship between incidence of temporary employment 
and share of trade, which is used to measure globalization. This is an outcome of Belgium and 
Ireland, and to some extent Austria, since all three countries are very dependant on 
international trade and have low levels of temporary employment. The percentage of 
employment in the service sector also shows an outcome discordant with the hypothesis. 
Unlike our assumptions, countries with high employment in the service sectors show low 
shares of temporary employment. This is a consequence of the fact that Liberal and Nordic 
countries have high levels of service sector employment as a percentage of dependant 
employment while not having such high incidences of temporary employment. On the other 
hand, Spain and Portugal have low levels of service sector employment while having high 
incidences of temporary employment. Also contrary to the hypothesis set above, generous 
unemployment benefits and high tax wedges show positive correlations with temporary 
employment shares. However, none of these variables show statistical significance in the 
relationships and all have very low coefficients, which make them negligible.   
Bargaining structure and union strength variables also disaccord with our hypotheses. 
Although the strength of the relationship is weak and insignificant, centralization of 
bargaining and collective bargaining coverage rate both show positive correlations with 
shares of temporary employment. This can be interpreted as some countries that have strong 
unions with centralized bargaining, and have centralized bargaining have higher temporary 
employment levels, which contradicts our hypothesis. In closer inspection, we can see that 
collective bargaining coverage rates and centralization of wage setting both have significant 
positive relationship with EPL for regular workers12. As suggested, this shows that countries 
with stronger unions and centralized bargaining have more stringent EPL levels. Based on this 
outcome, we can say that the association of the two bargaining variables show that the 
incidence of temporary employment is actually the relationship between EPL with the 
bargaining variables. In other words, these two bargaining variables can be expected to have 
an indirect effect on the incidence of temporary employment through EPL for regular workers. 
However, collective bargaining coverage rate and centralization of wage setting are highly 
correlated with each other (.72 in .001 level), so one would expect only one of the two will 
display a significance in the multi-variate analysis. 
                                                
 
12 Collective bargaining coverage rate show a .55 correlation in the .023 level and centralization of 
wage bargaining from 1990 to 2000 show a .53 correlation in the .024 level with EPL for regular 
workers. 
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Although bi-variate correlations do show us a glimpse of the relationships between 
the factors investigated with the shares of employment, because other factors have not been 
controlled for, further investigation is needed to come to a more concrete conclusion. 
 
3-5. Best fit model in explaining cross-national variance of temporary 
employment  
In this section, we seek to find the best-fit model that can account for the variance in 
the incidence of temporary employment for 2003. To do this, I first ran stepwise regressions 
to test which of the variables with missing country cases have significant effects and enters 
into a successful model in explaining the cross-national variance of incidence of temporary 
employment. The results of this shows that none of the variables contribute significantly to 
the model, with the exception of collective bargaining coverage rate in the analysis of 17 
countries. For this reason, I find a model that use all 19 country cases with the highest 
explanation power and then found another model that incorporates the collective bargaining 
coverage rate which explains the variance for 17 country cases. 
 
Table 7 Best-fit multi regression model for the incidence of temporary employment for 19 
OECD countries for 2003 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error T-score  
Coeffic
ient 
Std. 
Error T-score 
(Constant)   - 2.473 3.061 - 0.808   10.614 4.849   2.189
* 
         
EPL for regular 
workers 2003    3.844 1.083    3.549
**     4.124 0.923 4.469** 
         
unemployment 
ratio average 
94-03 
   0.857 0.279   3.072**     1.196 0.252 4.748** 
         
Real GDP growth 
rate average 
94-03 
     - 1.594 0.622 - 2.563* 
         
tax wedge for 
2003      - 0.302 0.107 - 2.819
* 
         
Adj. R2   0.56** 0.71**   
**  : Significant at the 0.01 level  
 *  : Significant at the 0.05 level  
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The best-fit models which explain the cross-national variance in the incidence of 
temporary employment of 19 OECD countries for the year 2003 are displayed in Table 7.  As 
we can see there are two models, one representing the one with the highest explanatory power 
and the other which is more robust and is not susceptible to change when certain country 
cases are taken out of the analysis. Model 2 explains 71 percent of the variation, while Model 
1 explains 56 percent. As both models show, stringent EPL for regular workers increases the 
shares of temporary employment. A long streak of bad labour market conditions, indicated 
here as the average unemployment rate for the past decade, is another factor that explains high 
levels of temporary work. Economic recession, represented here as the GDP growth rate 
average for the past ten years, and the tax wedge are also determinants in explaining the 
cross-national variance as we can see in Model 2. However, the two variables are significant 
only if both are included in the model and cease to be so if either one is excluded. Controlling 
for other factors, countries with high tax wedges have low incidence of temporary 
employment, as predicted in the hypothesis. This is probably through decreasing labour 
market participation incentives from the decrease in the difference between after tax wage and 
benefit levels. However, this can also result from a decrease in low-wage, low-skilled jobs on 
the demand side from the increase in labour costs to the employer, thus affecting the demand 
for temporary jobs. Also, countries with economic recession in the past 10 years have higher 
incidences of temporary employment which also accords to our predictions and preliminary 
studies. EPL for regular workers is the strongest factor in explaining the variance in the 
incidence of temporary employment across 19 OECD countries. This changes when other 
factors, GDP growth rate and the tax wedge, are controlled for and average unemployment 
rate becomes the strongest factor.  
The models in the table 8 show the best-fit regression models for 17 countries, 
excluding Ireland and Greece. Model 1 is still valid even when two country cases are 
excluded, while Model 2 looses its robustness. In the case of 17 countries, a new model, 
Model 3, is found, which includes collective bargaining coverage rate average for 1990 and 
2000. Even so, EPL for regular workers is still the foremost important determinant in the 
incidence of temporary employment with unemployment rate average being the second. In 
addition, Model 3 shows that countries with collective bargaining systems that cover a larger 
number of workers have a lower incidence of temporary employment. This has two 
implications. First of all, high coverage rates of collective bargaining might imply that there is 
a set wage floor that covers a wide population of workers. The result can than be interpreted 
as that in countries that have wage floors that cover large number of workers and are set at the 
central level, employers will cut low-wage, low-skilled jobs. Since low-wage, low-skilled 
jobs are usually temporary jobs, the shares of these jobs will decrease. On the other hand, if 
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we consider collective bargaining coverage rate as an indicator of union strength, the model 
result implies that stronger unions will stop the increase of flexible employment contracts due 
to these contracts being an impediment to union strength and bargaining power. There might 
be a reverse relationship, where, for countries with high shares of temporary employment for 
2003 have had high shares during the 1990s and this might have decreased the collective 
bargaining coverage rate. On the other hand, as mentioned before, collective bargaining 
coverage rate has a strong correlation with the EPL level for regular workers.  
 
Table 8 Best-fit multi regression model for the incidence of temporary employment for 17 
OECD countries for 2003 (Excluding Greece and Ireland) 
 
Model 1 Model 3 
 
 
Coeffi
cient 
Std. 
Error T-score  
Coefficie
nt 
Std. 
Error T-score 
(Constant)  - 3.201 4.023 - 0.796  - 0.226   2.729 - 0.083 
         
EPL for regular 
workers 2003    3.696 1.197   3.088**    5.050   1.096   4.609** 
         
unemployment ratio 
average 94-03    1.198 0.491   2.440*    1.127   0.254   4.446** 
         
collective bargaining 
coverage average 
    
 - 0.095   0.042 - 2.276* 
     
Adj. R2    0.50** 0.70**   
 
**  : Significant at the 0.01 level  
*  : Significant at the 0.05 level  
 
Based on this, a critical path analysis is elaborated to see the indirect effect collective 
bargaining coverage will have on temporary employment. This analysis enables us to examine 
the interconnections amongst the independent variables in the model, thus permitting us to 
distinguish direct and indirect effects (Castles, 2004:111). Here the standardized regression 
coefficients are given to show the strength of association and sequences of the variables 
included in the model (Castles, 2004:111). 
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Figure 2 Critical Path analysis of the incidence of temporary employment of 17 OECD 
countries for 2003 
Note: The figures in the diagram represent standardized regression coefficients. 
**  : Significant at the 0.01 level  
*  : Significant at the 0.05 level  
 
As we can see from the diagram collective bargaining coverage rate has a direct 
negative effect on the incidence of temporary employment. However, it also displays a highly 
positive effect on the levels of regulations on firing regular workers which is the foremost 
important determinant explaining for the incidence of temporary employment as shown by the 
standardized coefficient. In this sense, union strength not only has a direct negative but also 
an indirect positive impact on the shares of temporary employment. Based on this model, 
strong unions with centralized bargaining will stop the development of temporary 
employment. However, they will also increase, or have increased in the past13, the level of 
regulations on firing workers on regular contracts which has a larger positive effect on the 
incidence of temporary employment. In other words, although unions will try to stop the 
development of temporary employment, their influence on employment protection outweighs 
this effect. The result is that collective bargaining coverage rate has a positive relationship 
with the shares of temporary employment in the bi-variate analysis as seen in Table 6. 
Collective bargaining coverage rate also has a positive effect on the unemployment rate 
average but is insignificant so we do not go on further. 
                                                
 
13 The reason for this is that collective bargaining coverage rate, centralization and coordination indices 
all show negative correlation with the change in the regulations for regular workers although none of 
the relationship is significant. From this we can infer that the effect unions or the bargaining systems 
had on EPL happened before the late 1980s.  
Incidence of 
temporary 
employment 
2003 
Unemployment 
average  
1994 to 2003
EPL for regular 
workers 2003 
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage average 
1990, 2000 
- 0.40*
0.65**
0.76**
0.58* 
 0.36 
- 0.09
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Robustness of the Model 
Lastly, the robustness of the models is tested to see if they are susceptible to change 
when any country cases are taken out. This is done to examine if any of the models might be a 
single country dependant, and loose their stability when that case is taken out of the analysis. 
For Model 2, average GDP growth rate becomes insignificant when Ireland is taken out, to 
a .522 significance level14.  In the case of Model 1, average unemployment ratio loses its 
significance in explaining the variance of temporary employment when Spain is taken out 
(significant at the .581). For Model 3, there are minor changes in the significance level of 
collective bargaining coverage rate when specific countries cases are taken out, but even so, 
the variable is significant at 10 percent or higher. Also in Model 3, like Model 1, 
unemployment rate average becomes insignificant (significant at the .114) when Spain is 
taken out of the analysis. In conclusion, the most robust model in explaining the cross-
national variance in the level of the incidence of temporary employment in the OECD 
countries is as below. It consists only of a EPL for regular workers and a constant term yet 
explains approximately 35percent of the variance.  
 
Temp emp. = 3.167[2.997] + 4.257*EPL for regular workers [1.315]**  
(Adj. R2=  0.345)  
 - Numbers represent the regression coefficients and the numbers inside the [] represents the standard 
error. 
**  : Significant at the 0.01 level  
* : Significant at the 0.05 level  
 
 
EPL for temporary workers and temporary employment 
In the literature examined in section 2-4, it was predicted that EPL for temporary 
workers will also have an effect on the shares of temporary jobs in the economy. The 
hypothesis is that strict rules regarding the use of temporary contracts will decrease their use. 
However, as seen in the bi-variate analysis in Table 4, the EPL for temporary workers and the 
                                                
 
14 The significance of the average unemployment rate and tax wedge looses its significance when Spain 
is taken out, and average GDP growth rate is also susceptible to change when Switzerland is taken out 
but these are minor changes in the significance level and all variables are significant at least 90 percent.  
 34
disaggregate indices show positive relationships with shares of temporary workers which 
contradicts the predictions. Furthermore, the EPL indices regarding temporary contracts also 
displayed positive relationships with EPL for regular workers. This implies that they might 
have a negative effect on the incidence of temporary employment, but it is rather insignificant 
compared to the effects of EPL for regular workers. Likewise, it has also been suggested that 
the combination of stringent regulations on permanent workers and relaxed regulations on 
temporary workers will increase the share of temporary jobs. 
This hypothesis is tested by incorporating EPL for temporary workers and its 
disaggregated indices into the model found in the section above. As we can see in Table 9, 
contrary to the hypothesis, EPL for temporary workers and TWA legislation both show 
positive relationships with the incidence of temporary employment. However, they are 
insignificant in explaining the cross-national variance of temporary employment and even 
decrease the explanatory power of the model. Regulation on fixed-term contracts displays a 
negative relationship which agrees with the hypothesis, but this relationship proves to be 
insignificant as well. These results tells us that even if EPL for regular workers is controlled 
for, EPL for temporary workers, TWA legislation and fixed-term contract regulations do not 
have much effect on the shares of temporary employment. It also shows us how fixed-term 
contract regulations and TWA legislations might have different implications and impacts on 
the shares of temporary employment, which needs further investigation.  
Lastly, the relative strictness of EPL for regular workers was tested to see if it could 
explain for the high incidences of temporary employment. As the results show in Table 10, 
relative strictness of EPL for regular workers compared to that of temporary workers is also 
insignificant in explaining for the cross-national variance in shares of temporary employment. 
The same results occur when relative strictness of EPL is tested in the robust model excluding 
EPL for regular workers. Not only is relative strictness of EPL insignificant in explaining for 
the variance of temporary employment, it reduces the explanatory power of the model. 
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Overall, from the models presented above the following conclusions can be made. 
Employment protection legislation for regular workers is the foremost important determinant 
in explaining the cross-national variance in temporary employment. It is also the most robust 
variable in explaining the variance and is not susceptible to change by excluding certain 
country cases. Bad labour market conditions, presented here as the average unemployment 
rate for the past 10 years, also appears to be a strong factor, and is the strongest when some 
other factors are controlled for. Yet its explanatory power is weaker than that of EPL for 
regular workers when used alone in the bi-variate model and explains only 26.4 percent of the 
cross-national variance. Furthermore, it can be perceived to be the factor that accounts for the 
high incidence of temporary employment in Spain. High tax wedges in bad economic 
situations can also decrease the shares of temporary employment levels probably through 
increase in labour costs or though decreasing incentives of workers. Countries with high 
collective bargaining coverage rates will have lower shares of temporary employment while 
increasing the levels of EPL for regular workers.  
Globalisation, deindustrialization, unemployment benefit systems and government 
spending on labour market policies all have no significance in explaining cross-national 
variance. One explanation might be that these factors do not have any effect at all. It could 
also mean that these factors do not have direct effects but have an indirect effect over 
temporary work. However, none of the correlations between these variables and EPL for 
regular workers are of any significance. Further investigation will be needed for a definite 
conclusion15. It is important to note that it is the employment protection of regular workers 
that explains the relative share of temporary jobs across countries, and not the EPL for 
temporary workers, or any of its disaggregate indicators, nor the relative strictness of the EPL 
for regular workers. The most important factor in explaining high shares of temporary 
contracts is the cost of firing regular workers. It is more important than the difficulty in 
employing temporary workers, whether it may be fixed-term or temporary agency workers. 
 
4. Two paths towards flexibility and their implications 
Based on the results of the relationship between employment protection and the shares 
of temporary employment, it is conceivable that there are two different ways countries 
                                                
 
15  For example, unemployment benefit and EPL have been referred to as functional equivalent 
policies in protecting workers by numerous studies. Most of these studies examine the overall EPL and 
also have a more comprehensive measurement of UB. For more see Buti et al.(1998), Auer and Cazes 
(2003a), Chung (2003).  
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introduced flexibility in their labour markets. Countries with low employment protection for 
permanent workers achieve flexibility through regular contracts, for employers are able to 
hire and fire permanent workers easily. In countries with high employment protection for 
permanent workers, workers on permanent contracts are protected from the instability of the 
labour market, while there is an increase in flexibility through introducing other flexible 
employment such as temporary jobs, even if there are stringent rules that restrict employers 
from using temporary contracts. In fact, in countries with very relaxed employment protection 
for permanent contracts, employers would not need these new types of flexible jobs, for they 
can use the permanent contracts in the same way employers in countries with high firing costs 
for permanent workers use temporary contracts. For example, in Britain, there is no statutory 
definition of either temporary or permanent work, although temporary work refers to 
contracts with short duration and fixed period of time. However, to claim unfair dismissal and 
statutory redundancy pay, there is a 12 month qualification period of continuous employment 
(EIRO, 2002), which makes permanent workers that have been employed less than a year as 
vulnerable as temporary workers. As a result, countries with high levels of temporary jobs do 
not have high shares of workers with tenure of less than one year. As we can see in Figure 3, 
the US, with the lowest share of temporary employment, has the highest shares of workers 
with tenure less than one year. Spains share of workers with tenure of less than one year is 
lower than its share of temporary workers, which indicate that those on temporary contracts 
may be on contracts with long duration or on consecutive contracts.  
If we consider this, it is hard to say which country has a more flexible labour market. 
For employees, being employed in a flexible open ended contract where employers can fire 
workers without any additional costs, or being in a renewable temporary contract may have 
the same implications. Although there are problems that arise with temporary employment 
such as training opportunities, pay gap and the entitlement to social security and other fringe 
benefits, many of the same problems will arise with workers in open ended contracts with low 
tenure, since many of these problems arise due to lack of seniority (See EIRO, 2002). The 
working and employment conditions vary between countries and the difference between 
short-term open-ended contracts and temporary employment will vary accordingly.  
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Figure 3 Scatter plot of incidence of temporary employment, EPL for regular workers and 
shares of workers with tenure of less than one year and ten years or over  
Source: Data on temporary employment levels are from Table 1, data on tenure is from Auer and Cazes, 
(2003b)  
 
The important difference between the two types of countries depending on their level 
of employment protection is their protection of core workers. Countries with high EPL for 
permanent workers have higher percentage of workers with tenure of ten years of more. As 
we can see from Figure 3 above, countries with relaxed regulation on firing regular workers 
show an overall balanced distribution of workers between tenure. These countries include the 
US, Ireland, the UK with Denmark. On the other hand, in countries that have a mixture of 
stringent protection and temporary work, there is a segmentation of workers where a large 
portion of its workers are in insecure work contracts and another large portion is secured 
through high levels of EPL. Cahuc and Postal-Vinay calls this as an evolution toward a more 
flexible labour market [] to bring down unemployment without harming the so-called 
insiders who are protected by high job security (Cahuc and Postal-Vinay, 2001:1; for 
similar studies see Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Saint Paul, 1996). However, a closer 
inspection will be needed for further conclusions.  
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5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are two different ways flexibility has been introduced into the 
labour market in the past two decades. One way was to introduce flexibility throughout the 
market by using relaxed regulations on firing regular workers, whereas the other includes 
securing the core workers through high firing cost for regular workers while allowing for 
flexibility through the use of temporary employment. This development of temporary 
employment has been enforced by bad labour market situations and high tax wedges in 
adverse economic conditions. Also countries with high collective bargaining rates seem to 
have a negative impact on the share of temporary employment while having a positive effect 
on EPL for regular workers thus having mixed effects. This indicates that unions might be 
faced with the dilemma of either choosing an increase in the shares of temporary employment 
from maintaining strict restrictions against firing permanent workers, or agreeing with 
deregulation thus decreasing the shares of temporary jobs. In a sense this is a dilemma of 
what extent workers are willing to share the instabilities among each other. It might be that 
instabilities or insecurity can be shared throughout the market, or unions might choose to 
secure the core while exposing the others to the increase flexibility. However, there are other 
implications with the deregulation of employment protection other than the increase of 
temporary employment, and decisions must be taken carefully.  
Which of the two paths towards flexibility performs better is yet to be seen, although 
many studies have already pointed towards the deregulated market with lower firing costs as 
the better performer based on its economic growth and employment generation rates (for 
more see OECD, 2005). However, not only economic performance but also social outcomes 
must be taken into consideration when evaluating the performance of the different systems. 
More studies on the difference in the situations and working conditions between the flexible 
permanent workers and temporary workers are also needed. In most studies it is perceived 
that permanent work in different countries have similar implications, and temporary work 
being the same across countries. However, simply looking at the security provided by 
legislative factors, we can see that permanent work in some countries(for example the UK) 
might be as insecure as temporary jobs in others(for example Spain). The last point to make is 
that as we can see in this paper, the notion of flexibility needs to be taken with precaution. 
Even if we are only considering numerical flexibility there are many other things to be taken 
into consideration. Low protection levels cannot be automatically perceived as being part of 
the flexible market, while high levels do not necessarily imply a rigid market.  
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[Annex 1] Data definition and sources 
Levels of temporary employment 
- Operational variable: incidence of temporary employment as a percentage of 
dependant employment (%) 
- Definition: forms of dependant employment which do not offer workers the prospect 
of a long-lasting employment relationship and has limited duration (OECD, 2002a). 
Although fix-term contracts are the biggest share of this type of employment it also 
entails temporary agency workers, contracts for a specific task, replacement contracts, 
seasonal work, on-call work, daily workers, trainees, persons in job creation schemes  
and etc.. The specific sub-category list of jobs included in this statistic does differ 
between individual countries and the levels are somewhat based on national data 
sources and practices (OECD, 2002a).  
- Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics 2004 (Initial source: Most data are based on 
National or European Labour Force Survey) 
- Note: Data used here are for the year 2003 with the exception of the United States 
which the latest data available was for the year 2001. 
 
Employment Protection Legislation 
- Operational variable: EPL for regular workers, EPL for temporary workers, 
regulations on fix-term contracts, TWA regulations 
- Definition: Employment protection legislation is the regulations that concern hiring 
and firing of workers on both permanent and temporary contracts (OECD, 1999:50)16. 
To test how different regulations levels for different contract types, or how the 
combination of these will affect temporary employment levels we do not use the 
overall EPL level in the analysis. Instead we disaggregate the index to EPL for 
regular workers and EPL for temporary workers, and disaggregate the latter into 
regulations for fixed-term contracts and TWA regulations. All EPL indices are for the 
year 2003. Also the change of EPL for temporary workers from the late 1980s to 
                                                
 
16 For further information on specific scoring and weighting of the indices see Annex 2. 
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2003 is used to examine how deregulation of EPL effects the cross-national variance 
of temporary employment. 
- Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1999, 2004 
 
Globalization 
- Operational variable: share of trade of good and services as a percentage of GDP (%), 
Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (%) 
- Definition: Here we use two indicators, used in the study done by Castles (Castles, 
2004), to measure the extent a countrys economy is globalized or to see the degree 
integration of the nations economy into the global market. The first indicator of this 
is the share of trade of goods and services as a percentage of GDP, which indicates 
the extent of trade openness. The second variable used to indicate globalization is the 
share of foreign direct investment (FDI) which indicates the extent of international 
capital movement. This is measured as the average flow of direct investment in a 
country as a percentage of GDP.  
- Source: OECD Fact book 2005.  
- Note: Since there may be fluctuations between years the five year average from 1999 
to 2003 is used. For shares of trade, four year average from 1999 to 2002 was used 
for the Netherlands, the US, and Switzerland for the availability of data. In the case of 
FDI, two year average for the years 2002 and 2003 was used for Belgium because 
those were the only data accessible. 
 
Recession 
- Operational variable: Real GDP growth rate average from 1994 to 2003 (%), 
unemployment rate average from 1994 to 2003 (%) 
- Definition: Recession can be defined as downturn in the economy, of slow down of 
business activity in a country. Frequently used measures include unemployment rate 
and the GDP growth rate. Whereas GDP growth rates is the most common indicator 
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for economic conditions, unemployment gives us a more direct picture of the labour 
market conditions of individual countries. Also as examined in the literature, high 
unemployment affects the attitude of employees on taking up temporary employment 
so both measures are examined.  
- Source: OECD Labour Force Indicators, OECD Economic Outlook, 2004 
- Note: Based on the literature, protracted recessions and the effect it has on the level of 
temporary employment is of importance here and not the yearly economic recession. 
We will consider the average rates of the past ten years. 
 
Labour market structure - Deindustrialization 
- Operational variable: share of agriculture employment as a percentage of total 
dependant employment (%), share of service employment as a percentage of total 
dependant employment (%) 
- Definition:  For the indicators of labour market structural changes, this paper will 
look at both, the share of agriculture as a percentage of total dependant employment 
and service workers as a percentage of total dependant employment. Here I use total 
dependant employment for the dependant variable, temporary employment is 
measured as a percentage of the dependant employment.  
- Source: Labour Force Indicator 
- Note: Data for the United States, Netherlands, and Greece is for the year 2002. Data 
for Belgium and Switzerland is not available. 
Wage bargaining institutions and union strength 
- Operational variable: union density collective bargaining coverage rate, centralization, 
coordination 
- Definition: Union density is the percentage of workers that have membership in the 
union, and here it refers to net members excluding those who are non-active (OECD, 
2004b:144). Collective bargaining measures the extent salaried workers are subject 
to union-negotiated terms and conditions in employment (OECD, 2004b:146). 
Centralisation score range from 1 to 5. 1 = Company and plant level predominant. 2 = 
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Combination of industry and company/plant level, with an important share of 
employees covered by company bargains. 3 = Industry-level predominant. 4 = 
Predominantly industrial bargaining, but also recurrent central-level agreements. 5 = 
Central-level agreements of overriding importance. Co-ordination is measured like 
wise 1 = Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no co-ordination by upper-
level associations. 2 = Fragmented industry and company-level bargaining, with little 
or no pattern-setting. 3 = Industry-level bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and 
moderate co-ordination among major bargaining actors. 4 = a) informal co-ordination 
of industry and firm-level bargaining by (multiple) peak associations; b) co-ordinated 
bargaining by peak confederations, including government-sponsored negotiations 
(tripartite agreements, social pacts), or government imposition of wage schedules; c) 
regular pattern-setting coupled with high union concentration and/or bargaining co-
ordination by large firms; d) government wage arbitration. 5 = a) informal co-
ordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing union confederation; b) 
co-ordinated bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition of a wage 
schedule/freeze, with a peace obligation (OECD, 2004; 151).  
- Source: All union variables are from the OECD employment Outlook 2004, chapter 
317.  
- Note: Union density and collective bargaining coverage rate is the average for the 
year 1990 and 2000. Collective bargaining coverage rate, centralization and 
coordination indices are for 1990 to 2000. The reason we choose this time average is 
because union strength and the influence of bargaining structures are not of that 
specific year but of the overall trend. Collective bargaining coverage rate data for 
Greece and Ireland is not available. Also for Greece, the indices for centralization and 
coordination are also not available. 
 
Unemployment Benefit 
- Operational variable: Benefit duration (months), gross benefit replacement rate (%) 
- Definition: Benefit duration shows the maximum duration for a 40-year-old single 
worker without children, with a 22-year employment record. Benefit replacement 
rates is defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates 
for two earnings levels(67% and 100% of average production worker), three family 
                                                
 
17 For more information on the source of the data see OECD, 2004b, Annex 3.1.  
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situations(single, one-earner married couple, dual-earner married couple) and three 
durations of unemployment(first year, 2nd and 3rd year, 4th and 5th year).  
- Source: OECD Benefits and Wages 2004  
- Note: Benefit duration is for the year 2002 and benefit replacement rate is for the year 
2001. 
Tax wedge 
- Operational variable: tax wedge (%) 
- Definition: The tax wedge reflects income tax plus employee contributions less cash 
benefits plus employer social security contributions. The index used here is the tax 
wedge as a % of total labour costs equivalent to the average production worker who is 
single (OECD, 2004c).   
- Source: OECD Taxing Wages 2004 
- Note: Data is for 2003. 
 
Public expenditure on labour market policy 
- Operational variable: Expenditure on active labour market policy as a percentage of 
the GDP (%), expenditure on employment generation as a percentage of GDP (%). 
- Definition: Expenditure on active labour market policy includes public employment 
services and administration, labour market training, youth measures, and subsidized 
employment, and measures for disabled. Here for employment generation includes 
subsidies to regular employment in the private sector, direct job creation(public or 
non-profit) which is sub-categories of subsidized employment, and support of 
apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training which is a sub-category of 
youth measures. These measures are chosen for they are the categories that are 
directly connected to employment generation.  
- Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004  
- Note: Data for most countries is for the year 2001 to 2002 with the exception of 
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Canada, Ireland(2001), Denmark, Portugal(2000) and Greece(1998). One variable is 
included in the analysis at a time to avoid multicollinearity18 problems. 
 
                                                
 
18 Expenditure on employment generation is made up of sub-categories of ALMP. For this reason, the 
two expenditure levels as a percentage of GDP are highly correlated (.51 with the significance level 
of .027).  
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[Annex 2] EPL index 
The EPL index data used in this study is from the OECD Employment Outlook(2004) 
which follows the methods set by Grubbs and Wells(1993). Here, employment protection is 
defined as the regulations concerning hiring (e.g. rules favouring disadvantaged groups, 
conditions for using temporary or fixed term contracts, training requirements) and firing (e.g. 
redundancy procedures mandated pre-notification periods and severance payments, special 
requirements for collective dismissals and short-time work scheme)(OECD, 1999b;50). The 
EPL strictness level is measured here are divided into three categories, the strictness of 
employment protection of regular workers, regulations of temporary employment, and 
regulations of collective dismissals weighed as 5/12, 5/12, 2/12 respectively. The scoring 
method is as follows. Countries were assigned scores from 0 to 6 for all indicators with higher 
values representing more strict regulation. Then summary scores are derived for the three 
main areas by averaging individual scores per indicator (OECD, 1999: 54). The limit to this 
index is that it does not include the employment protection provided by the markets, 
collective bargaining agreements and court interpretations of legislations and contractual 
provisions, which also serve as a way of employment protection (OECD, 1999). 
 
EPL summary indicators and weighting scheme 
Level 4 Level3 level2 Level1 
Procedures                                                       (1/2) Procedural 
inconveniences  (1/3)Delay to start notice                                         (1/2)
Notice after period 
9months       (1/7)
4years          (1/7) 
20months     (1/7)
Notice and severance 
pay for no-fault 
individual dismissals 
(1/3) Severance pay after 
9months       (1/7)
4years          (1/7) 
20months     (1/7)
Regular 
contracts 
(5/12) 
Difficulty  
of dismissals 
(1/3) 
Definition of unfair dismissals                        (1/4) 
Trial period                                                      (1/4) 
Compensation                                                  (1/4) 
Reinstatement                                                  (1/4) 
Fixed-term contracts
 
(1/2) 
Valid cases other than the usual objective             (1/2) 
Maximum number of successive contracts              (1/4) 
Maximum calculated durations                        (1/4)Temporarycontracts 
(5/12) Temporary work Agency (TWA) 
employment (1/2) 
Types of work for which is legal                     (1/2)
Restrictions on number of renewals                (1/4) 
Maximum calculated duration                         (1/4)
Overall 
 
summary 
 
indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collective dismissals       (2/12) 
Definition of collective dismissals                   (1/4)
Additional notification requirements               (1/4)
Additional delays involved                              (1/4)
Other special costs to the employer                 (1/4)
 
Source: OECD 1999; 188 
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 [Annex 3] Disaggregate indices of EPL for temporary employment for late 1980s and 
2003 
 
 fixed-term contract  TWA legislation 
 late 1980s 2003 change  late 1980s 2003 change 
Austria 1.8 1.8   0.0  1.8 1.3 - 0.5 
Belgium 5.3 1.5 - 3.8  4.0 3.8 - 0.2 
Canada 0.0 0.0   0.0  0.5 0.5   0.0 
Denmark 1.3 2.3   1.0  4.0 0.5 - 3.5 
Finland 3.3 3.3   0.0  0.5 0.5   0.0 
France 3.5 4.0   0.5  2.6 3.3   0.7 
Germany 3.5 1.8 - 1.7  4.0 1.8 - 2.2 
Greece 4.0 4.5   0.5  5.5 2.0 - 3.5 
Ireland 0.0 0.8   0.8  0.5 0.5   0.0 
Italy 5.3 2.5 - 2.8  5.5 1.8 - 3.7 
Japan 1.0 0.5 - 0.5  3.5 2.0 - 1.5 
Netherlands 1.5 0.8 - 0.7  3.3 1.6 - 1.7 
Norway 3.3 3.3   0.0  3.8 1.0 - 1.3 
Portugal 2.3 1.8 - 0.5  4.5 3.8 - 0.7 
Spain 1.5 3.0   1.5  5.5 4.0 - 1.5 
Sweden 2.7 1.8 - 0.9  5.5 1.5 - 4.0 
Switzerland 1.3 1.3   0.0  0.5 1.0   0.5 
UK 0.0 0.3   0.3  0.5 0.5   0.0 
US 0.0 0.0   0.0  0.5 0.5   0.0 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 1999, 2003
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